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I.  Introduction 
 
          With the economic crisis in East Asia and a continuing boom in the US, 
American triumphialism is in the air. The latter is perhaps not unexpected and 
probably does no harm. But what is more questionable is the view held in the highest 
circles in the US Government and international financial organisations in Washington 
which causally links  the so-called Asian model of capitalism to the economic and 
financial crisis which is currently engulfing the hitherto highly successful economies 
of East and South East Asia. 
 
Thus, Mr. Greenspan, the cautious chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in his 
recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggested that, in 
the last decade or so, the world has observed “a consensus towards, for want of a 
better term, the Western form of free-market capitalism as the model which should 
govern how each individual country should run its economy…We saw the breakdown 
of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the massive shift away from central planning towards 
free market capitalist types of structures.  Concurrent to that was the really quite 
dramatic, very strong growth in what appeared to be a competing capitalist-type 
system in Asia.  And as a consequence of  that, you had developments of types of 
structures which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you could not 
demonstrate that so long as growth was going at 10 percent a year.”1 Mr. Larry 
Summers, the U.S Treasury Under Secretary puts the matter in slightly different 
terms.   The Financial Times (February 20, 1998) reports him as arguing that the roots 
of the Asian financial crisis lie not in bad policy management but in the nature of the 
economies themselves.  Summers states: “(this crisis) is profoundly different because 
it has its roots not in improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems that 
must be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the 
private sector more and the public sector less.” Similar views have been expressed 
perhaps in more measured terms by the Managing Director of the IMF, Mr. Michel 
Camdessus.2
 
A central aim of this paper3 is to systematically assess the validity of this 
influential and important thesis, i.e., the paper will explore to what extent, if any, the 
so-called ‘Asian model’ is responsible for the present crisis in countries like Thailand, 
                                                          
1 Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1998. 
2 See, for example, Mr. Camdessus’ speech to Transparency International reported in 
the IMF Survey, February 9, 1998. 
3  The analysis and arguments of this paper draw on Singh (1998) 
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Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea.  This question is also important in part because in 
economic terms until very recently this model seems to have been exceptionally 
successful.  It is no exaggeration to say that the industrialisation and economic 
development of  the Asian newly industrialising countries (NICs), as well as Japan in 
the post-World War II period, has been the most successful example of fast economic 
growth in history. Moreover, the ‘Asian model’, in addition to its economic merits, 
has also had a number of attractive qualities from a social point of view, e.g. poverty 
reduction, lifetime employment and  relatively equal income distribution.  In contrast, 
the alternative Western or American model has acquired some  unappealing social 
characteristics as it is increasingly based on the doctrine of promoting labour market 
flexibility.  Social protection which hitherto workers enjoyed is being greatly 
diminished and a growing number of jobs are being “informalised.”4
 
In view of the economic and social merits of the Asian model, it is important 
to ask whether the model also entailed some long run hidden costs.  Was it for e.g. 
likely to lead to the kind of crisis which descended suddenly and almost 
simultaneously on several of the hitherto highly successful economies.  Such an 
analysis will obviously involve, inter alia, an assessment of other factors which may 
have been responsible for the crisis. 
 
From the practical policy perspective, the central issues for the affected East 
Asian countries are the appropriateness and the effectiveness of the IMF remedies.  
Will these measures enable these economies to adjust quickly so that they can go back 
to their long-term trend growth path?  Or will the world witness another “lost decade” 
of the kind experienced by Latin America in the 1980s under IMF tutelage following 
the debt crisis.  
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section II reports on the economic and 
social achievements of the leading East Asian NICs and of the Asian model over the 
last three to four decades.  As we shall see, Joseph Stiglitz, former Chairman of the 
US Council of Economic Advisers and now Chief Economist at the World Bank, and 
an eminent but dissident member of the Washington Establishment, is quite right to 
observe that “no other economic model has delivered so much, to so many, in so short 
a span of time.”  Section III outlines the essential characteristics of the Asian model.  
These have been the subject of an intense debate in the past, but as will be shown 
below, current events appear to be leading to a consensus on the broad contours of the 
system.  Sections IV examines alternative theories of the current financial crisis, 
paying particular attention to the idea that the Asian economic system itself is the 
main cause of the financial turmoil.  Section V reviews the evidence bearing on these 
issues.  Section VI analyses the IMF policy programmes in East Asia including, inter 
alia, the extent, if any, to which these may have contributed to the crisis. Section VII 
sums up the analytical conclusions of the paper and comments on their policy 
implications. 
 
II. Industrialisation and Catch-up in Asia, 1955-1995            
                                                          
4 The Nobel Laureate Paul A. Samuelson (1997) has emphasised the following 
characteristics of the U.S. model: “One, in America we now operate what we call the 
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The Asian model of “guided” capitalist development originated in and is epitomised 
by the post World War II experience of Japan, especially in the high growth period 
between 1950 and 1973. In the early 1950s, after the economy had recovered from the 
war and at the end of the period of U.S. occupation, the Japanese economic situation 
was not much different from that of a developing country. The total value of Japanese 
exports in 1952 was less than that of India’s (Krueger, 1995);  exports consisted 
mainly of textiles and other labour intensive products. In 1955, Japan produced only 5 
million tons of steel and 30,000 automobiles. U.S. production at that time was 90 
million tons of steel and nearly 7 million cars. Japan possessed few natural resources 
for producing steel or other heavy industrial products, and indeed the Japanese costs 
of producing steel were at that time considerably greater than the prevailing world 
prices. Nevertheless, disregarding short term comparative advantage and against 
almost all economic advice, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
deliberately encouraged and orchestrated the development of heavy industry in Japan.  
The rest is history. By the mid-1960s, Japan emerged as the lowest cost steel producer 
in the world and was outselling the U.S. steel industry in the U.S. itself.  By early 
1970, it was producing as much steel as the U.S.  By 1975, Japan had overtaken 
Germany as the largest exporter of automobiles in the world. By 1980, Japan 
produced more automobiles than the US.  Looking back on this phenomenal growth, 
this incredible catch-up occurred over the relatively short space of 30 years.  
 
One might argue that Japan was a special case because it had been undergoing 
industrialisation since the Meiji Restoration in 1870. However, Korea, which 
consciously followed the Japanese economic strategy was unequivocally backward in 
industrial development in the 1950s. In 1955 Korea’s per capita manufacturing output 
was only $US 8 compared with $US 7 in India and $US 60 in Mexico.5  Less than 
four decades later, Korea has become an industrially developed economy. It competes 
with advanced economies in a wide range of industrial products. Next to the U.S., it is 
the second most important country in the world in electronic memory chip technology 
(DRAM). By the year 2000, Korea was expected to become the fourth largest 
producer of automobiles in the world.  
 
The Japanese and Korean development models have been followed to varying 
degrees in Taiwan and Singapore but, more significantly, also in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Thailand.  There are important differences in aspects of industrial strategy 
followed by these five countries compared with that of Japan and Korea. The second 
group of countries have, for example, relied much more on FDI compared with the 
first group. Nevertheless, all these countries have followed the basic model of guided 
capitalist development rather than relying on free competitive markets.  
 
The outstanding economic success of this group of East and South East Asian 
countries, together with Hong Kong, is widely acknowledged. These countries have 
been able to industrialise quickly and grow very fast over the last three decades (see 
Tables 1 & 2). Indeed, since 1980, this part of the world has emerged as the most 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ruthless Economy. Two, in America we now have a Cowed Labour Force.” 
5 The source of these figures is Maizels (1963). Quoted in Amsden and Hikino 
(1993). 
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dynamic region in the world economy ( Table 1). Between 1980 - 1995, developing 
East Asia was growing at three times the rate of growth of the world economy.  
 
Significantly, fast growth was accompanied by low inflation as is indicated by 
the data for the affected Asian countries in Tables 3.  Moreover, World Bank (1993) 
notes “… For the eight HPAEs (high performing Asian economies), rapid growth and 
declining inequality (in income distribution) have been shared virtues, as comparisons 
over time of equality and growth using Gini coefficients illustrate.”6 In addition, as 
Stiglitz rightly emphasises, one of the most important achievements of Asian 
countries during this period was an enormous reduction in poverty.  Stiglitz (1998a)  
observes: “In 1975, six out of 10 Asians lived on less than $1 a day. In Indonesia, the 
absolute poverty rate was even higher. Today, 2 out of 10 East Asians are living in 
absolute poverty. Korea, Thailand and Malaysia have eliminated poverty and 
Indonesia is within striking distance of that goal. The USA and other western 
countries, which have also seen solid growth over the last 20 years but with little 
reduction in their poverty rates, could well learn from the East Asian experience.”7 
Indonesia’s success in reducing poverty is particularly remarkable. In 1970, 60% of 
the population was living below the official poverty line. By 1996, the proportion had 
fallen to 12%, while during this period the population had increased from 117 to 200 
million. (IMF Survey 16 August 1997.)  Table 5 shows changes in social indicators of 
development for selected ASEAN countries between 1970 and 1994.  
 
There is still further evidence which suggests that these high performing 
economies, most of which were working under some version of the Asian model, not 
only achieved fast growth for the last three decades, but that this growth was widely 
shared.  Between 1980 and 1992, real wages in the fast growing Asian NICs rose at a 
rate of 5 per cent a year, whilst at the same time employment in manufacturing 
increased by 6 per cent a year.  Some of these hitherto labour surplus economies 
began to experience a labour shortage and imported labour from neighbouring 
countries.  Overall, in South East and East Asia, there was a vast improvement in the 
standards of living of literally hundreds of millions of people, especially if China is 
also included in this group of countries.8  
 
The above highly positive East Asian record stands in striking contrast to that 
of large parts of the developing world in the recent period.  In relation to Latin 
America, for example, ILO (1995) reports that during the 1980s and the early 1990s 
there was a steady fall in modern sector employment, with paid employment falling at 
a rate of 0.1 per cent a year.  This reversed the trend of the previous three decades, 
when steady economic growth had led to a significant expansion of modern-sector 
employment. Tokman (1997) reports that there has been a huge “informalization” of 
the labour force in Latin America since the debt crisis of the early 1980s, that is, four 
                                                          
6 The World Bank’s conclusion of declining income inequality in East Asian 
economies is, however, subject to important qualifications. See further, Singh (1995a, 
1997a) and UNCTAD (1997). 
7 “Restoring the Asian Miracle”, Wall Street Journal, Europe (February 3, 1998, p. 4). 
8 Although China has a different political system, there is evidence that during the last 
two decades of the relative liberalisation and marketisation of the economy, the 
country has attempted to emulate the East Asian model. See further, Nolan (1995) and 
Singh (1996a). 
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out of five new jobs that have been created during the last fifteen years are low 
quality, informal jobs paying low wages.  The average real wage in Latin American 
manufacturing in 1995 was still below its pre-debt crisis level. 
 
III. The East Asian Model 
Before any causal connection can be established between the Asian model of 
capitalism and the current financial crisis in the South East and the East Asian 
countries, it is important to be clear about the precise  nature of this model of 
development. In this connection it is interesting to observe that, in the 1990s, the 
international financial institutions’ (IFIs) theses -- specifically the World Bank’s -- 
concerning (a) the basic characteristics and (b) the effectiveness of the Asian model 
have undergone a number of distinct changes. 
 
At the first stage, in a seminal contribution,9 World Bank (1991) claimed the 
East Asian countries were successful because they followed a “market-friendly” 
strategy of development and integrated their economies closely with that of the world 
economy. In order for the term not to be a mere tautology, the Bank’s economists to 
their credit defined “market-friendly” in a fairly precise way as follows:  
1.  “intervene reluctantly”, i.e. the government should intervene in economic 
activity only if the private sector is unable to do the tasks required  
2.  interventions should be subject to checks and balances  
3.  interventions should be transparent. This characterisation essentially 
suggested a “night watchman” state, the main task of which was to provide 
the legal framework and the infrastructure necessary for private enterprise 
to flourish.  
 
These propositions concerning the East Asian economies could not however 
be sustained as they were greatly at variance with facts. Critics pointed out that all the 
evidence suggested that the governments in countries like Japan and Korea did not 
“intervene reluctantly”. Rather they pursued a vigorous industrial policy, the basic 
purpose of which was to change the matrix of prices and incentives facing private 
enterprise in the direction preferred by the planners. Similarly students of the subject 
pointed out that neither Japan or Korea for instance closely integrated their economies 
with the rest of the world. Although both countries were export-oriented, both of them 
made extensive use of selected import controls to protect specific industries.10 
Moreover both countries discouraged rather than promoted inward foreign 
investment. 
 
At the second stage, in response to these criticisms, in another seminal 
publication in 1993 (The East Asian Miracle), World Bank economists significantly 
changed their characterisation of the  East Asian model. The fact of enormous 
                                                          
9 The significance of this contribution is discussed in Singh (1995a). 
10 As late as 1978, long after Japan had become a member of the OECD and had 
greatly reduced or abolished most formal import restrictions of the earlier era, its 
manufactured imports were only two percent of GDP. The comparable figures for 
countries like France, Germany and Britain were at that time five to six times as large. 
See Singh (1994). 
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government interventions in these economies was now fully acknowledged. The 
World Bank (1993) stated: 
 
Policy interventions took many forms - targeted and subsidised credit to 
selected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to 
increase profits and retained earnings, protection of domestic import 
industries, the establishment and financial support of government banks, 
public investment in applied research, firm- and industry-specific export 
targets, development of export marketing institutions, and wide sharing of 
information between public and private sectors. Some industries were 
promoted while others were not. 
 
Nevertheless, the Bank argued that, although the government intervened heavily, 
these interventions were neither necessary nor sufficient for the extraordinary success 
of the East Asian countries. The World Bank (1993)concludes: 
 
What are the main factors that contributed to the HPAE’s superior allocation 
of physical and human capital to high yielding investments and their ability to 
catch up technologically? Mainly, the answer lies in fundamentally sound, 
market-oriented policies. Labour markets were allowed to work. Financial 
markets … generally had low distortions and limited subsidies compared with 
other developing economies. Import substitution was … quickly accompanied 
by the promotion of exports. … the result was limited differences between 
international relative prices and domestic relative prices in the HPAE’s. 
Market forces and competitive pressures guided resources into activities that 
were consistent with comparative advantage … 
 
In other words it was suggested that, notwithstanding the facts of heavy government 
intervention in East Asian economies, the Bank’s traditional policy conclusions - that 
countries should seek their comparative advantage, get the prices right, have free 
markets as far as possible - are still valid.  
 
Now, in the wake of the current financial crisis in South-East Asia, the IMF in 
particular is suggesting that important characteristics of the East Asian model are 
dysfunctional.11 Especially singled out for criticism are: (a) the close relationship 
between government and business, and (b) various distortions to competitive markets. 
The relationships under (a) are regarded as creating crony-capitalism, leading to 
corruption and a myriad inefficiencies in resource allocation. The inference is that 
these countries should go back to the World Bank (1991) prescription of a “night 
watchman” state and an economy which is closely integrated with the world 
economy. 
 
                                                          
11 As indicated earlier, The World Bank’s Chief Economist, Professor Stiglitz, takes a 
rather different view of the crisis than that of the Fund. However, as Wade & 
Veneroso (1998) suggest the position is closer to that of the IMF than to Professor 
Stiglitz. 
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The Bank’s critics vigorously dispute its theses on the lack of effectiveness of 
interventions in the East Asian economies.12 There is, however, now much greater 
agreement between the two sides on the broad description of the model as outlined in 
the first of the two quotations from World Bank (1993) above. Based on my own 
previous research and that of other scholars, there would be more or less agreement 
on the following important characteristics of the East Asian model in it’s ‘ideal form’: 
13  
 
1.  The close relationship between the government and business where the 
government does not do anything without consulting business and vice versa. 
 
2.  Many interventions are carried out through a system of “administrative guidance” 
rather than through formal legislation.  
 
3.  The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in countries 
like Japan and Korea has also been very different from that of the US and the UK. 
The former countries have followed, for example, the so-called main bank system 
which involves long-term relationships between the corporations and the main 
banks. This enables Japanese or Korean managers to take a long-term view in 
their investment decisions. The managers are not constrained by the threat of 
hostile take-overs on stock markets as is the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
4.  There are differences in the internal organisation of East Asian corporations 
compared with those of the US and the UK. The former involve co-operative 
relationships between management and labour, epitomised by the system of 
lifetime employment. This implies considerable imperfections in the labour 
market. 
 
5.  As for the competition in product markets, such competition is not regarded by the 
East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like the US, 
economic philosophy in the East Asian countries does not accept the dictum that 
“the more competition the better.” The governments in these countries have taken 
the view that, from the perspective of promoting investment and technical change, 
the optimal degree of competition is not perfect or maximum competition. The 
governments have therefore purposefully managed and guided competition: it has 
been encouraged but also restricted in a number of ways.14  
 
6.  Following this basic economic philosophy outlined above, the East Asian 
governments have sought not “close” but what might be called “strategic” 
integration with the world economy i.e. they have integrated up to the point where 
it has been useful for them to do so. Thus during their high-growth, developmental 
phases, Japan (between 1950 - 1973) and Korea (1970s and 1980s) integrated 
                                                          
12 For comprehensive critical analyses of the World Bank (1993) theses, see the 
contributions in Amsden (1994); see also Singh (1995a). 
13 See Singh (1995a, 1997a, 1997b); see also Okimoto (1989), Tsuru (1993), Amsden 
(1989), Wade (1990) and Amsden and Singh (1994). 
14 For a fuller discussion, see Amsden and Singh (1994). 
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with the world economy in relation to exports but not imports; with respect to 
science and technology but not finance and multinational investment. 
 
As notes above, this is a characterisation of the East Asian model as an ideal type. Not 
all countries, or even Japan and Korea have followed the model exactly at all times in 
the post-war period.  As far as the government-business relationships are concerned 
there is a continuum with the closest relationship to be found in Korea, and the least 
close in Thailand.  Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between.  Similarly, the main bank 
system worked differently in Korea compared with Japan.  Unlike Japan, where the 
“main banks” were by and large private entities, in Korea for much of the period these 
were directly state-controlled.  Only in the recent period have they been privatised.  
Nevertheless, there is considerable truth in the view that the Asian way of doing 
business and the institutional structures it has generated are considerably different 
from those of countries like the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
IV. Causes of the Crisis 
Table 6 outlines the salient financial  facts concerning the crisis in the East and South 
East Asian countries during the last six months. In the worst affected country, 
Indonesia, the stock market has fallen by more than 80 per cent and  the exchange rate 
of the rupiah against the dollar by almost 75 per cent.  This implies that a foreign 
investor who invested $100 in a company quoted on the Indonesian stock market 
would have seen the value of the investment fall by 96 per cent during the half year. 
By the same token, it also means that if a foreign corporation had to pay $100 to 
acquire an Indonesian company in July 1997, it could in principle purchase it now for 
only $4. This is of course not just a theoretical possibility, but as Krugman (1998) 
notes, there is evidence of a “fire sale” of East Asian assets currently in progress in 
the wake of the financial crisis.15 The twin crises of the stock and currency markets 
have  also resulted in corporate and financial sector bankruptcies with huge losses of 
production and jobs.  
 
Those who attribute the crisis to the failings of the Asian model suggest that, 
while there may have been various immediate triggers -- a property price bubble, 
macroeconomic mistakes (for example, supporting for far too long a nominally fixed 
exchange rate), a fall in the rate of growth of exports, or a regional contagion effect -- 
the underlying causes were structural and an integral part of the Asian model of 
capitalism.  The crisis manifested itself in the form of “overinvestment” (see further 
below), misallocation of foreign capital inflows, and severe problems in the financial 
sector.  The financial structure of the corporations and the banks, as well as other 
deficiencies of the state-guided or state-directed financial systems in Asian countries, 
made these economies very fragile. IMF (1997, p.14) points to the following specific 
structural weaknesses of the most affected economies: 
 
                                                          
15 Krugman reports that in the case of South Korea, the price of its corporations to 
foreign buyers essentially fell by 70 percent during 1997. Thus, the stock market 
value of Korean Air Lines with a fleet of more than 100 aircraft at the end of 1997 
was only $240 million. This is approximately the price of two Boeing 747s. However, 
any acquirer would also have to take on the Korean Air Lines debt of $5 billion. 
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• In Korea, the industrial structure has been heavily influenced by government 
intervention, including, as well as directed credits, regulations and explicit or 
implicit subsidies. The resulting lack of market discipline has contributed to 
the problem of unproductive or excessive investment that has played a role in 
the build-up of the recent crisis.  
 
• In Indonesia, trade restrictions, import monopolies, and regulations have 
impeded economic efficiency and competitiveness, and reduced the quality 
and productivity of investment. 
 
• In Thailand, political disarray at various times during 1996-97, including in 
the wake of the November 1996 general election, delayed the implementation 
of necessary policy measures.  In these and other cases, the power of special 
interests has often appeared to have had considerable influence on the 
allocation of budgetary resources and other public policy actions. 
 
• In a number of countries, uncertainty has been increased and confidence 
adversely affected  by inadequate disclosure of information and data 
deficiencies, particularly with regard to extra- budgetary fiscal transactions, 
the quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank, directed lending, the problem 
loans of financial institutions, official foreign exchange reserves and their 
management (including reserve-related liabilities), and private sector short-
term debt.  There has also often been a lack of transparency in policy 
implementation, such as with the decisions regarding public infrastructure 
projects and ad hoc tax exemptions. 
 
The failure of the Asian model thesis has powerful proponents including Mr. 
Greenspan, Mr. Summers and the IFIs. But it is by no means the only significant 
available  theory with respect to the financial crisis. Many Asian political leaders 
have put forward an entirely different perspective.  They are prone to blame the whole 
of the crisis on the activities of foreign speculators and reject the view that the crisis 
was essentially “home grown” ( to use the phrase of the I.M.F Deputy Managing 
Director, Mr. Stanley Fischer).   
 
A more sophisticated version of this “external factors” view is contained in the 
recent academic literature spawned by the Mexican crisis of 1994.16 These 
contributions, based on careful theoretical and empirical analyses, show that it is 
entirely possible for a financial crisis to occur even when a country’s fundamentals 
are totally sound. It may arise because of changes in investor sentiment or perceptions 
which may be triggered off entirely by external events such as changes in  interest 
rates or equity prices in advanced countries. Some of these theories suggest that such 
crises of confidence can be self-fulfilling prophecies. Other models use the analogy of 
the classic panic-induced run on the banks to describe the present financial crisis in 
East Asian countries.  
 
                                                          
16See for example Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), 
Cole and Kehoe (1996), Krugman (1998). 
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A third important theory ascribes the crisis to liberalisation of the global 
financial markets, and particularly to the deregulation of the capital account which 
many Asian countries had undertaken in the preceding period.  It is suggested that the 
latter was the main cause of the crisis rather than any structural factors connected with 
the Asian development model.  Indeed, it is argued that if these countries had 
continued to follow the Asian model of state-guided investment and state direction of 
the financial system, there would not have been a crisis at all in the first place. The 
crisis occurred directly as a result of  deregulation and liberalisation when the 
governments relinquished controls over the financial sector as well as corporate 
investment activities. This led to misallocation (towards, for example, the property 
sector) of investment as well as overinvestment.  
 
As these theories are central in determining the choice of remedies for the 
crisis, it is clearly important to know which of them is more congruous with the facts.  
The events are too close to be able to provide anywhere near a definitive explanation 
of the crisis, but the following section will review the evidence.  
 
 
V.  Evidence on the Theories Concerning the Crisis 
  
The survey below of available evidence bearing on the alternative theories of the 
present financial crisis in South East and East Asian countries is organised around the 
following themes: 
(a) the role of fundamentals; 
(b) the proximate cause of the crisis – the capital supply shock; 
(c) the role of structural factors; and 
(d) financial liberalisation 
 
V.1.  Fundamentals 
The most important point to note here is that all the affected countries prior to the 
crisis had for a long time enjoyed strong “fundamentals.” This is evident from our 
earlier discussion in Section II and from the more detailed data presented in Tables 1-
3. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea had all recorded extraordinarily strong 
economic growth for many years; their inflation rates were usually in single figures 
and much below the developing country average. These countries also had high 
domestic savings rates, indeed considerably greater than those of other developing 
countries including Brazil, Mexico, and India (the three countries for which data is 
provided in Table 4 for comparative purposes.) 
 
Moreover, the crisis countries had healthy fiscal positions. The public sector 
finances were either in surplus or had small sustainable deficits. The fiscal position of 
these countries compared very favourably with the average of developing countries as 
well as with that of Brazil, Mexico, and India.  
 
A potentially significant blemish on this generally positive pre-crisis long-
term economic record was the position of the current account balance in the some of 
the affected countries. Thailand and Malaysia have experienced huge current account 
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deficits, which in the 1990s amounted to nearly 6.9 percent of GDP in the case of 
Thailand, and 6 percent of GDP for Malaysia.  In 1996 the Thai current account 
deficit was almost 8 percent of GDP while that of Malaysia had fallen to 4.9 percent. 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that both those countries had a relatively low debt 
service to exports ratios throughout the 1990s -- 4.5 percent for Thailand, and 6 
percent for Malaysia.  Furthermore, in the case of Malaysia, as Table 7 on external 
capital flows indicates, the high current account deficit was to a considerable extent 
financed by a strong net inflow of foreign direct investment. 
 
The Korean current account deficit in 1996 was 4.9 percent of GDP, an 
unusually high figure for Korea. Korea was not, however, a persistent offender - its 
average deficit during the 1990s was less than 2 percent of GDP. The larger 1996 
deficit was caused by special circumstances, notably the collapse of prices of semi-
conductors of which Korea was a major exporter.  However, this sharp  increase in the 
current account deficit was a temporary phenomena, as one would expect from a 
highly diversified export-oriented economy. Indeed, in the last quarter of 1997 the 
Korean economy recorded a huge current account surplus of $3 billion. Indonesia’s 
current account deficit during the 1990s averaged 2.6 percent of GDP; in 1996 it was 
3.3 percent, an entirely sustainable figure on the past record of the economy. The only 
country where the current account deficit could be regarded as a real problem was 
Thailand. This is mainly because the deficit was being financed by bank borrowings 
(see Table 7). 
 
It is also relevant to observe that, as late as September 1997, the Korean debt 
had a high rating from western rating agencies.  Similarly, until almost the eve of the 
financial crisis in August 1997, the IMF was praising the Indonesian government for 
its successful management of the economy as well as for its achievements in reducing 
poverty.17  
 
To sum up, all the affected Asian countries had strong “fundamentals” in the 
sense of a proven record of being able to sustain fast economic growth. In view of 
their export orientation, they also had the ability to service their debts in the long 
term. They did, however, suffer to varying degrees from short term imbalances such 
as overvalued exchange rates, as well as short term liabilities of the financial sector 
which exceeded the value of the central bank’s reserves. This required some 
macroeconomic adjustments and restructuring of debts. In other words, these 
countries had problems of liquidity rather than solvency. In this context Wolf’s 
(1998) observations concerning Indonesia are pertinent: 
 
Dwell for a moment, on Indonesia: its current account deficit was less 
than 4 percent of GDP throughout the 1990’s; its budget was in 
balance; inflation was below 10 percent; at the end of 1996 the real 
exchange rate (as estimated by J.P. Morgan) was just 4 percent higher 
than at the end of 1994; and the ratio to GDP of domestic bank credit 
to the private sector had risen merely from 50 percent in 1990 to 55 
percent in 1996. True, the banking system had mountains of bad debt, 
but foreign lending to Indonesian companies had largely bypassed it.  
Is anyone prepared to assert that this is a country whose exchange rate 
                                                          
17See IMF Survey, vol. 26, no. 16, August 18, 1997. 
 11
one might expect to depreciate by about 75 percent? Some exchange-
rate adjustment was certainly necessary; what happened beggars 
belief. 
 
V.2. The Capital Supply Shock 
It is generally agreed that the proximate cause of the crisis in all the four affected 
countries was the capital supply shock – the sudden interruption and reversal of 
normal capital inflows into these economies.  Table 8, which provides aggregate 
financing figures for these countries plus the Philippines, indicates that their net 
external capital inflows more than doubled between 1994 and 1996 -- from a little 
over $40 billion to more than $90 billion. The latter figure greatly exceeded the 
combined current account deficits of these countries, allowing them to build sizeable 
reserves. In 1997, however, there was a huge capital supply shock: the net inflow of 
$93 billion in 1996 turned into a net outflow of $12 billion in  1997, a turnaround of 
$105 billion.  The latter figure is equivalent of 10 per cent of the pre-crisis GDP of 
these countries (Wolf (1997).  The decomposition of the capital inflows in Table 8 
suggests that the most volatile item was commercial bank lending which turned from 
a positive figure of over $50 billion in 1996 to a negative figure of $21 billion in 
1997.  
 
What the above evidence on the “fundamentals”, as well as the analysis of 
section II on the long-term supply-side capabilities of these economies suggests is 
that, whatever the trigger for the crisis (whether external macroeconomic imbalances 
or the liabilities of the financial institutions) the foreign commercial banks grossly 
over reacted, giving rise to a classic panic induced bank—run, with the difference that 
it is the external creditors who were withdrawing their funds (from, say, Thailand) 
before the country defaulted. Such behaviour on the part of the banks makes default 
or a major IMF bail-out a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
V.3. Structural Factors 
Turning to the “structural factors” connected with the Asian model, which the IMF 
and others implicate in the crisis, we  first consider the issue of “transparency.” It is 
suggested that, because of the nature of the Asian corporations (involving extensive 
cross-subsidisation of subsidiaries) and their close, non-arm’s length relationship with 
banks, and similar relationships between banks and governments, the markets did not 
have enough information about the true financial status of the corporations and the 
banks. This is regarded as being one important reason for the overreaction by the 
markets.18
 
                                                          
18Thus Mr. Camdessus (1998): “In Korea, for example, opacity had become systemic. 
The lack of transparency about government, corporate and financial sector operations 
concealed the extent of Korea’s problems – so much so that corrective action came 
too late and ultimately could not prevent the collapse of market confidence, with the 
IMF finally being authorised to intervene just days before potential bankruptcy.” 
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However, in relation to this proposition, the following observations are 
relevant.  First, as Stiglitz (1998a) notes, following financial liberalisation there have 
been similar banking crises in the early 1990s even in the Scandinavian countries. 
These countries would be regarded by many as being at the top of any international 
transparency league: the availability of reliable information was evidently not 
adequate by itself to prevent financial panics.  Secondly, it is specifically claimed that 
international banks did not have accurate and timely information on the shortening 
maturity of bank claims on Asian countries.  This complaint is also controversial.  As 
Professor Alexandre Lamfalussy, the former chief economist at the Bank of 
International Settlements noted in a recent letter to the Financial Times (February 13, 
1998):  
 
…the Bank for International Settlement is encouraged to speed up the 
publication of its statistics on international bank lending…The 
suggested improvement will surely do no harm but it will not do much 
good either as long as market participants and other concerned parties 
fail to read publicly available information or to draw practical 
conclusions from it. 
 
In the summer of 1996 the BIS reported in its half yearly statistics that 
by end-1995 the total of consolidated bank claims on South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia reached $201.6bn. It reported in 
January 1997 that by mid-1996 the figure rose to $226.5bn and six 
months later, that by end-1996 it reached $247.8bn – an increase of 23 
per cent in one year. For each of these dates the maturity breakdown 
was available. It was therefore known by mid-summer 1996 that bank 
claims maturing within one year made up 70 per cent of the total for 
South Korea, 69.4 per cent for Thailand, 61.9 per cent for Indonesia, 
but “only” 47.2 per cent for Malaysia. 
 
Professor Lamfalussy goes on to add: 
Moreover, in its Annual Report published on June 10 1996, the BIS 
did not hesitate to use strong words describing developments that had 
taken place already in 1995: ‘…By year end, Thailand had become the 
largest bank debtor in the developing world….  
 
Thirdly, in relation to this argument about transparency and information, it is also 
pertinent to note that international banks lent huge sums of money to merchant banks 
in South Korea.  Most of the latter did not have a long enough track record, being less 
than two years old (Chang 1998). Many would regard such lending practices to be 
highly imprudent, if not reckless. 
 
Turning to other structural features of the Asian model which it has become 
customary to blame for the crisis, we consider first the questions of overinvestment 
and misallocation of investment in countries like Thailand to the non-productive 
property sector.  Here the IMF’s critics are quite right to say that, if in the process of 
financial liberalisation, the governments of countries like Korea and Thailand had not 
eschewed control over their financial sector and corporate investment activity, such 
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overinvestment and misallocation would not have occurred.  Indeed, until financial 
liberalisation, the Thai government had regulated investment going into the property 
sector.  It was therefore not the Asian model but the abandonment of one of its 
essential features which was directly responsible for the observed weaknesses that 
came to the fore. 
 
Another structural characteristic of the Asian model which is the subject of 
much adverse comment in orthodox analysis of the current crisis pertains to corporate 
finance.  As is well known, the typical corporation particularly in Japan, Korea, or 
Thailand is heavily geared, i.e. has a high ratio of debt to the equity capital of the 
shareholders.  The Korean chaebol enterprises which spear-headed that country’s 
extraordinarily successful industrialisation drive and the continuous technological 
upgrading of its exports over the last three decades are typically family owned.  They 
are however very big – 11 South Korean companies are included in Fortune 
magazine’s top 500 in the world.  To put this figure into perspective, it may be useful 
to note that Switzerland, a far more developed economy, also has only 11 companies 
in the world’s top 500.19 In order for the families to be able to own such huge 
corporations, the equity component of the total invested corporate capital tends to be 
small relative to debt. Table 9 shows the debt-equity ratios of leading Korean 
corporations. Table 10 provides a comparative analysis of the debt equity ratios of the 
largest quoted companies in nine emerging markets in the 1980s and 1990s.  It clearly 
indicates that the Korean companies are relatively very heavily geared with a median 
value of 4.3 between 1980 and 1994. However the bottom two parts of the Table 
indicate that between the early 1980’s and the early 1990’s, this ratio fell from 5.48 to 
3.96 . The Table also reveals that the Asian corporations, including those from India, 
have considerably higher debt-equity ratios than those of the Latin American 
corporations.   
 
However, the important point to note is that such corporate financial 
arrangements have been functional within the traditional Asian economic system.  
This is in part due to the continuous monitoring of the corporations by “main banks” 
with whom they have long term relationships, as well as to the close oversight by the 
government over the banks.  These arrangements were particularly useful during 
Korea’s industrialisation drive, as the corporations were induced by the government 
to enter into new technological areas involving huge risks. Left to themselves, the 
corporations may not have been able to undertake such risks, but with the government 
becoming in effect a co-partner through the banking system, such technological risks 
were “socialised”. Following the work of Williamson (1976), Lee (1992) has 
characterised this system as essentially constituting an internal capital market. In view 
of the well known weaknesses of free capital markets (e.g., a tendency towards short 
termism and quick profits) such an internal capital market may in fact be more 
efficient than the former.20
 
However, such a corporate system became dysfunctional when, for example, 
in Korea the government undertook during the last few years a process of financial 
liberalisation (under pressure from the U.S. government and the IFI’s, but see the 
                                                          
19See further Amsden and Hikino (1994), Singh (1995). 
20There is a large literature on these issues. For a fuller discussion, see further Aoki 
and Patrick (1996); Singh (1996b); Singh and Weisse (1998). 
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discussion in Section VII).  Korea resisted allowing non-residents to buy majority 
stakes in its corporations.  However, its mistake was to implement other components 
of capital account liberalisation by permitting Korean companies and banks to raise 
money abroad without the traditional supervision and control.  So, in that sense, it 
was again financial de-regulation (i.e. the dismantling of a fundamental aspect of the 
previous system) which rendered the system dysfunctional and fragile. 
 
It is interesting in the above context to consider the case of India. As Table 10 
indicates, the Indian corporations are also very highly geared. Moreover India’s 
fundamentals, as Tables 3 and 4 (discussed earlier) indicate, were much weaker than 
those of the East Asian countries. Nevertheless, India has not had a financial crisis. At 
a time of deep turbulence in the currency markets of its South East and East Asian 
neighbours, the Indian currency market has been a model of stability. Why? Most 
observers would agree that the main reason for this is that India has extremely limited 
capital account liberalisation. It does not allow its corporations or banks to borrow or 
lend capital abroad without government approval. It has carried out some 
liberalisation by allowing non-residents to purchase shares directly on the Indian 
stock markets, but they cannot become majority shareholders. This limited, cautious 
openness, the relatively small size of foreign portfolio inflows as well as that of the 
stock market itself have been helpful to the Indian economy. The Indian currency is 
consequently much less vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment or speculative 
attacks from outside. 
 
VI. The IMF Policy Programme and the East Asian Crisis 
As the financial crisis deepened in East Asia during the last six months and more and 
more countries became involved, the IMF assembled large financial packages to bail 
out the affected countries. However this aid was available only in return for draconian 
conditionality. Apart from their usual policies of demand restraint (cuts in money 
supply, high interest rates, fiscal retrenchment, etc.) the IMF went further. It 
demanded far-reaching changes in the economic and social systems of these 
countries. These changes included still more liberalisation of the financial sector 
(including permitting hostile take-overs of domestic firms by non-residents); changes 
in the system of corporate governance, in labour laws, in government business 
relations, and in competition policy. Such measures were insisted on because it was 
believed (erroneously as we have seen above) that the root cause of the crisis was the 
“dirigiste” institutional structures and policies of these countries.  
 
The IMF policy programmes for the affected Asian countries have been 
heavily criticised by leading economists from both inside and outside the economic 
establishment21.  Taken as a whole, the critics’ case is formidable and telling.  The 
main points may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The IMF’s traditional policy programme of demand restraint etc. is typically 
designed to deal with countries with persistent current account disequilibria, fiscal 
deficits, and over-heated economies. For the Asian economies, however, except 
                                                          
21See among others Sachs (1997); Stiglitz (1998 a, b); Feldstein (1998 a, b); Wade and 
Veneroso (1998); Amsden and Euh (1997); Akyuz (1997). 
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perhaps to some extent for Thailand, the problem has been one of capital account 
disequilibrium rather than that of current account imbalances. Moreover, as we 
have seen earlier, the public sector finances in these countries have been by and 
large in equilibrium and it is the private sector which is in severe disequilibrium. 
In these circumstances, the large fiscal austerity demanded by the IMF’s original 
programmes for these countries would have made matters worse rather than 
better, pushing the countries deeper into recession, and thereby exacerbating the 
private sector financial disequilibria.  
 
2. The high real interest rates entailed by the IMF programmes would have similarly 
deleterious effects on the private sector’s viability. Such rates will lead to the 
bankruptcy of a large part of the sector,  deepening the depression of the real 
economy. In response to this criticism, the IMF has argued that higher interest 
rates are required for restoring international confidence in the countries’ policies. 
Stiglitz’s counter argument  is that there is little empirical evidence to support the 
view that high interest rates improve confidence. He goes on to add that one could 
perhaps make a case for an increase in interest rates for a brief spell, but countries 
like Indonesia and Thailand have had real interest rates of 20 per cent or more 
now for nearly nine months.  
 
There is some truth in both these contentions.  Evidence from the financial crisis        
in the various parts of the world suggests that higher interest rates help before a 
crisis has occurred (i.e. they may forestall the crisis), but once the crisis has taken 
place, increasing interest rates is regarded by the market as a sign of weakness and 
is therefore counter productive. 
 
3. The IMF is quite right to stress the importance of prudential regulation and 
supervision of the financial sector.  Certainly, financial liberalisation by the 
affected countries without such regulations was serious mistake.  However, to 
forestall the crisis, the IMF should have discouraged financial liberalisation by 
these countries until the appropriate regulatory  regime was in place.  This the 
institution did not do, presumably because of its own strong commitment to 
external account liberalisation. Further, it is a moot point whether under a regime 
of free capital flows, prudential regulation of the domestic financial sector, 
without that of international banks as well, would have been enough to prevent a 
financial crisis (Akyuz, 1997; Stiglitz, 1998).  
 
4. The misdiagnosis of the crisis by the IMF (that it has been due to the diridiste 
model of the Asian capitalism rather than being caused by internal and external 
financial liberalisation) has had serious adverse short as well as long term 
consequences for the affected countries. It is certainly arguable that the Fund’s 
emphasis on what it perceived to be the fundamental structural difficulties of the 
Asian model (crony capitalism, corruption etc. ), panicked foreign investors still 
further, and thereby worsoned the crisis (Feldstein, 1998a, b).  
 
5. As the evidence outlined earlier (the strong fundamentals, the large inflows of 
private capital from abroad and IMF’s own seal of approval for economic 
management of these countries until the eve of the crisis), suggests the East Asian 
crisis was originally one of liquidity rather than solvency. In these circumstances, 
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it would have been preferable for the Fund to have acted as an intermediary to 
help bridge the gap between lenders and borrowers over the mismatch of 
maturities. Instead, the institution raised huge sums of money for bail-outs and 
imposed far-reaching conditionalities on the crisis countries which could be 
interpreted as signalling a deeper solvency rather than a mere liquidity crisis.  
 
6. Professor Feldstein [1998 a, b] makes an important point of political economy 
concerning the IMF programmes which deserves serious consideration by the 
international community. He notes that the IMF is an international agency whose 
purpose ought to be to provide technical advice and, as appropriate, the financial 
assistance necessary to help countries overcome a balance of payments crisis with 
as little loss of output and employment as possible. It may also wish to ensure that 
the country continues to follow the right economic policies so that, as far as 
possible, the situation does not re-occur. However, he suggests that the IMF 
“should not use the opportunity to impose other economic changes that, however 
helpful they maybe, are not necessary to deal with the balance-of-payments 
problem and are the proper responsibility of the country’s own political system.” 
 
Professor Feldstein proposes the following three-point test for the structural aspects of 
the IMF conditionalities:  
 
In deciding whether to insist on any particular reform, the IMF should 
ask three questions:  Is this reform really needed to restore the 
country’s access to international capital markets?  Is this a technical 
matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper jurisdiction 
of a sovereign government?  If the policies to be changed are also 
practised in the major industrial countries of Europe, would the IMF 
think it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries if they 
were subject to a fund program?  The IMF is justified in requiring a 
change in a client country’s national policy only if the answer to all 
three questions is yes. (Feldstein, 1998b) 
 
Unfortunately, the answers to none of the three questions above for Korea, for 
example, is in the affirmative.  The structural reforms the IMF has asked for include 
labour regulations, corporate governance, the relationship between government and 
business. These clearly involve deeply political matters. Apart from the questions of 
morality and national sovereignty, even in practical terms insisting on such far-
reaching conditionalities would not appear to be a good idea at all for resolving a 
financial crisis. Few governments can deliver such reforms in a short space of time 
and this unnerves the markets, making the resolution of the crisis more difficult. 
 
VII. Analytical Conclusions and Policy Implications 
VII.1  Analytical conclusions 
The main analytical arguments of this paper may be summarised as follows.  
Firstly, the current widely held and highly influential thesis that the  root cause of the 
present financial crisis in South East and East Asian countries lies in the dirigiste 
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model of Asian capitalism pursued by  these countries is seriously mistaken. The 
analysis of the paper suggests that the fundamental reason for the crisis is to be found 
not in too much, but rather in too little government control over the financial 
liberalisation process which these countries implemented in the recent period. 
 
Secondly, in view of the rather different circumstances of the Asian countries 
(compared with the kinds of countries that usually face financial difficulties), the IMF 
staff appears to have misdiagnosed the crisis. They have therefore proposed 
inappropriate remedies (for example, further financial liberalisation, large fiscal 
austerity, a steep rise in real interest rates) which are likely to deepen the crisis. 
Moreover, market confidence, which was of critical importance in the evolution of the 
crisis, is unlikely to have been helped by the IMF’s emphasis on the ostensible 
fundamental structural weaknesses of these countries and requirement that they 
should implement far-reaching reforms in their economic and social systems. All 
these factors contributed to turning what was essentially a liquidity problem into one 
of solvency. 
 
Thirdly, as explained in the previous sections, the governments of the affected 
countries made serious errors by not controlling the financial liberalisation process. 
Although it is true that the IMF as well as the U.S. government have been urging 
capital account liberalisation for these countries, it is also the case that a growing 
domestic constituency also supported such liberalisation. Thus, for example, prior to 
the crisis, Thailand and Malaysia were vying with one another as well as with Hong 
Kong and Singapore to assume the role of regional financial centre.  This necessarily 
entailed considerable financial liberalisation. In the euphoria accompanying the large 
inflows of capital during the 1980s and 1990s, the benefits of  becoming a regional 
financial centre were readily seen, (the development of the financial services industry, 
skilled employment etc.).  However, the governments seemed oblivious to the 
potential costs.22
 
In addition to the pursuit of financial liberalisation without proper institutional 
controls, the governments of some of the crisis countries (particularly Thailand) might 
also have made some macroeconomic mistakes, for example, not adjusting the 
exchange rate, relying on short-term capital to finance a large current account deficit.  
Nevertheless, a central argument of this paper is that, although these government 
policy errors may have initiated the crisis, this was compounded by other factors: the 
lack of co-ordination between banks and the desire of each bank not to renew its 
short-term loans following the crisis of confidence; the herd behaviour of 
international investors which was partly responsible for the “contagion” throughout 
the region; and, as suggested above, the inappropriate policy response from the IMF 
to the confidence crisis.  Thus a liquidity problem has been transformed into a far 
more serious solvency problem. 
 
                                                          
22 Chang (1998) notes that a major ambition of the previous South Korean government 
was for the country to become an OECD member during its own term of office. In 
pursuit of that ambition the government was willing to forsake important parts of the 
Asian model, particularly control over investment activity and the financial 
transactions of large firms and banks. 
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VII.2  Policy implications 
What are the policy implications of these conclusions?  The basic policy issues which 
are closely interlinked are as follows: 
 
1) How to restore investor confidence so that normal capital flows in the 
region are resumed; 
 
2) How to ensure that long-term growth in the real economy is restored as 
quickly as possible; and 
 
3) How to provide immediate assistance to the millions of people who are 
likely to become unemployed or pushed back into poverty once again. 
 
The importance of the last issue cannot be exaggerated. This is not just for 
humanitarian reasons but, as indicated in the previous section, it is also necessary for 
maintaining social peace. To provide such assistance effectively and on an adequate 
scale will require not only considerable imagination but also a large expansion in 
government activity and often direct intervention in the market processes.  Such 
emergency safety net programmes may include wider subsidies, food for work 
schemes and public works projects, including the kind of labour intensive 
infrastructural projects which the ILO has pioneered in countries like Indonesia.23  
How to pay for these measures within the limits of fiscal prudence, let alone within 
the IMF fiscal austerity programmes, will be a major issue of political economy for 
these countries. 
 
Turning to the first policy issue, the most important requirement for achieving 
a resumption of normal capital flows to the affected countries are economic policies 
which are credible and have wide domestic political support.  Such credibility is much 
more likely to be achieved if there is political unity in the country and if there is close 
co-operation not only between government and business but also labour and civil 
society organisations in a national programme to resolve the economic situation.  This 
would inevitably mean that the burden of adjustment would need to be equitably 
shared by all sections of society.  Thus, the traditional Asian model of capitalism 
essentially based on corporatism becomes all the more essential if the present acute 
economic crisis is to be overcome. 
 
The first best approach to resolving the present crisis of confidence is for the 
IMF and the affected countries to co-operate closely on the essential and immediate 
narrow task of restoring their access to the international capital markets. For this 
purpose, the IMF should act as an intermediary between the international banks and 
other major creditors on the one side and the private sector debtors on the other, in 
order to achieve a rapid restructuring of the debt.  In this role, the institution needs to 
reiterate to investors and creditors the healthy fundamentals of these countries, their 
proven strong supply-side potential, their export orientation and therefore their ability 
in the medium to long term to service their debts.  It is significant and most 
encouraging that in response to the criticism of its policy programmes, the IMF has 
already made some important changes such as softening the strong demand restraint 
                                                          
23 For a fuller discussion of these short-term measures see Islam (1998). 
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measures required of Thailand and Korea.  Although somewhat late in the day (rather 
than before the crisis began) the Fund has also been participating in discussions to 
facilitate the re-scheduling of the debts.  However, the institution needs to go a great 
deal further in the direction of its critics. For the long term, the IMF should seriously 
re-examine  its whole project of promoting capital account liberalisation in 
developing countries.24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 For a fuller discussion of the issues concerning capital account liberalisation see 
further Singh (1997), Singh & Weiss (1998). 
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